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Abstract
Much of everyday language is vague, yet standard game-
theoretic models do not find any utility of vagueness in co-
operative situations. We report a novel experiment, the fourth
in a series that aims to discern the utility of vagueness from the
utility of other factors that come together with vagueness. We
argue that the results support a view of vagueness where the
benefits that vague terms exert are due to other influences that
vagueness brings with it rather than to influences of vagueness
itself.
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Introduction
The classic Keefe and Smith (1996) gives what we shall call
the standard definition of vagueness: “vague predicates have
borderline cases, have fuzzy boundaries, and are susceptible
to Sorites paradoxes” (p. 4). A canonical example is the con-
cept tall. Lipman (2009) argues that a limitation of standard
game-theoretical models of communication is that they are
unable to explain why so much of everyday language is vague
in what we called the standard sense. Among others, van
Deemter (2009) argues that benefits of vagueness can accrue
when, e.g., vagueness reduces costs for speaker or hearer.
One feature of previous work on the utility of vagueness
is that the term vagueness is used in different ways by differ-
ent researchers, e.g., Peters et al. (2009); Mishra, Mishra, and
Shiv (2011). In each case empirical benefits are demonstrated
of a factor that constitutes vagueness in a way that does not
meet the standard definition. For example, the Mishra et
al. (2011) work describes benefits of a factor described as
vagueness that really amounts to adding (versus not adding)
margins of plus and minus 3% to a value that is then pre-
sented to participants. Adding these margins does not seem
to us to permit borderline cases: the margins instead define a
range crisply. In Peters et al. (2009) vague terms (poor, fair,
good, excellent) are added (versus not added) to a numerical
value. While these words do permit borderline cases as in the
standard definition, the vague words appear together with an
added plot that indicates the borders of each term crisply on
a numerical scale.
These examples show that manipulations that are intended
to add vagueness to otherwise crisp numerical values some-
times do not succeed in a way that satisfies the standard def-
inition of vagueness. In a series of experiments we set out
to manipulate the borderline cases aspect of vagueness, by
comparing crisp and vague references to objects based on
cardinality. In doing so we have found that the vague form,
while it may meet the standard definition, and while it may
bring benefits, often contains other features apart from the
borderline-cases aspect of vagueness. These other features
bring with them their own influences (possibly benefits) that
are not attributable to the presence of borderline cases in the
vague term. The empirical challenge is then to factorially
isolate the influence of borderline cases from these other in-
fluences that seem to come with vagueness, across a series of
experiments.
Previous experiments in the series
The experiment reported in this paper is the fourth in a se-
ries - the previous three experiments are described in detail in
Green and van Deemter (2011) and summarised in this sec-
tion.
A pilot experiment was carried out first. Each stimulus
consisted of a pair of squares containing the following num-
ber of dots: (2,4) (2,6) (3,5) (5,9) (6,8) (7,3) (7,9) (8,4), and
an instruction to choose one of the squares with reference to
the number of squares - this was either crisp (e.g., Choose the
square with seven dots) or vague (e.g., Choose the square with
many dots). The task was to select the appropriate square by
means of a key press. Responses were timed and error rates
were recorded. The main focus was to compare responses to
vague instructions with responses to crisp instructions, hy-
pothesising that in line with the cost reduction hypothesis
(Green & van Deemter, 2011), vague instructions would yield
faster and more accurate responses. We found that vagueness
did not exert a main effect. Instead, vagueness had different
effects depending on whether one of the squares contained
a subitizable1 number of dots. For stimuli that did contain
a subitizable number of dots, vagueness tended to produce
longer response times and more errors, against the cost re-
duction hypothesis. For stimuli that did not contain a subiti-
zable number of dots, vague instructions yielded faster re-
sponse times and fewer errors, but only when the instruction
identified the larger number in the pair.
In a follow up experiment we used only non-subitizable
numbers of dots in the squares, as follows: (5,25) (10,25)
(15,25) (20,25) (30,25) (35,25) (40,25) (45,25). The instruc-
tions were either crisp (e.g., Choose the square with 45 dots)
or vague (e.g., Choose the square with many dots). This time
we found that vague instructions reliably yielded faster and
1subitizable is used to refer to quantities smaller than 4
more accurate responses, but that the vagueness advantage
diminished as the size of the difference in the number of dots
grew larger, as plotted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Experiment 2 results
We could not be sure from this experiment whether the
vagueness advantage was really due to vagueness or to
number-avoidance because one feature of this way of opera-
tionalising vagueness is that all the vague instructions avoided
numbers while all the crisp conditions mentioned numbers:
thus the vagueness advantage may have been an advantage
for avoiding numbers in the instructions.
Another feature of this way of operationalising vagueness
is that the nature of the forced choice task varies over the
vague and crisp forms. The vague terms invite the participant
to compare the target identified in the instruction against the
distractor to establish that one square is more or less numer-
ous than the other. The crisp forms invite the participant to
match the target identified in the instruction with one of the
two squares in the stimulus – this means that the participant
must establish the numerosity of the squares more accurately,
which is presumably time-consuming and could therefore ex-
plain the vagueness advantage that we observed as a benefit
for the less time-consuming comparison task.
At this stage we had identified a response time advan-
tage for vague instructions versus crisp instructions, and we
had identified some plausible alternative explanations for
the effect: number-avoidance in the vague conditions versus
number-use in the crisp instructions; and comparison in the
vague instructions versus matching in the crisp instructions.
We set out to plan a series of experiments that could distin-
guish vagueness from these other factors. Firstly, we wanted
to make sure that we were dealing with vagueness in the clas-
sic sense that focuses on the presence of borderline cases.
Both the pilot experiment and the follow-up used 2 squares in
each stimulus and a definite article in the instruction. We in-
creased the number of squares to three, and changed the def-
inite article to an indefinite article in the vague forms so that
any vague reference to a square with few dots or a square with
many dots would have more than one candidate target square
such that one of the candidate squares would represent a bor-
derline case of the vague expression - this ensured that the
potential for vagueness in terms like many and few could be
realised in the experiment.
Our approach to distinguishing the effects of vagueness
from those of number-avoidance and comparison was to take
each of the alternatives separately and set up a factorial ex-
periment that crossed the influence of the alternative with
vagueness under the expectation that the alternative explana-
tion would be given a chance to exert itself as a main effect,
and that if vagueness had any additional explanatory value it
would interact with the main effect of the alternative explana-
tion.
This led us first to plan an experiment that pitted vague-
ness against number-use, to test the hypothesis that number-
avoidance could explain the vagueness advantage. In this
third experiment in the series, sets of numbers were as fol-
lows: (6,15,24) (16,25,34) (26,35,44) (36,45,54). We also
manipulated number use and vagueness factorially in the in-
structions. This gave four conditions for the instructions, in
which we used an indefinite article to reflect that there can be
more than one appropriate response when there are borderline
cases: crisp number, Choose the square with 16 dots; crisp
word, Choose the square with the fewest dots; vague number,
Choose a square with about 20 dots; vague word, Choose
a square with few dots. We found a main effect of number
use, but no interaction with vagueness and no main effect of
vagueness. The number-avoiding instructions yielded faster
responses than the number-using instructions, but within the
number-using instructions there was no effect of vagueness,
and within the number-avoiding instructions there was no ef-
fect of vagueness, as plotted in Figure 2. The third experi-
ment showed us that we could not reject number-avoidance
as an alternative explanation of the vagueness advantage, al-
though we could not distinguish between benefits of number-
avoidance and benefits of the the comparison task in this ex-
periment.
Figure 2: Experiment 3 results
Next we set up two experiments to pit vagueness against
the second alternative explanation (an advantage for the com-
parison task versus the matching task). We decided to plan
two experiments to cover this because we wanted to take into
account the possibility that number-avoidance could be the
driver for the benefits that we had identified in experiment
3 and control for this by keeping it constant within each ex-
periment while we manipulated vagueness and the selection
task. We set up two factorial manipulations of vagueness with
selection task, one at each level of number-use, to form exper-
iments 4 (discussed in this paper) and experiment 5 (in prepa-
ration to be run at the time of writing). The present Experi-
ment 4 constitutes a factorial manipulation of vagueness and
selection task with the constraint that all conditions must use
a number in the instruction. If we found an effect of vague-
ness on the main effect of selection task in this experiment,
we could then be sure that it was not explainable as an effect
of number-use. Experiment 5 will constitute a factorial ma-
nipulation of vagueness and selection task with the constraint
that all instructions must refrain from mentioning a number
so that we can sure that any effect of vagueness on the main
effect of selection task will not be explainable as an effect of
number-use.
The current experiment
In this, the fourth experiment in the series, we manipulate
vagueness in references to cardinality in which all references
must use a number.
The domain consists of sets of three dot arrays, together
with an instruction to the participant to choose one of these
arrays, where the target is indicated in all conditions by its
cardinality (see Figure 3 for an example stimulus, and Table
1 for examples of the instructions).
With reference to Figure 3, whereas to obey the instruction
that says ‘Choose a square with 6 dots’ requires the partic-
ipant to establish that a square has the particular number of
dots stated in the instruction (a matching task), the alterna-
tive ‘Choose a square with fewer than 10 dots’ only requires
the participant to distinguish the available squares from each
other well enough to see that one contains the smallest num-
ber of dots (a comparison task). At each level of the selec-
tion task we also presented vague and crisp forms in a facto-
rial 2x2 manipulation, and held number-use constant over all
forms.
If vagueness is responsible for driving the advantages that
we have seen so far, then it should exert a main effect in these
exclusively number-using references to cardinality. On the
other hand if the selection process factor is driving the advan-
tages independently of the borderline cases aspect of vague-
ness then we should not observe any additional benefits in the
vague references.
Choose a square with 6 dots
Figure 3: Experiment 4 example trial stimulus
Method
Apparatus
A MacBook Pro laptop with a 13 inch screen was used to
display the stimuli and collect responses. The stimuli were
presented and responses were collected using GNU Octave
(Eaton, 2002) and the Psychtoolbox extensions for MatLab
or Octave (Brainard, 1997). Statistical analyses were carried
out using R (R Core Team, 2013). The statistical models were
built using the lmer package and p values were obtained using
the lmerTest package.
Design
In this experiment we factorially manipulated vagueness
(with two levels, vague and crisp) and selection process (with
two levels, matching and comparison), constraining all con-
ditions to use numerals. This led to four experimental condi-
tions illustrated in Table 1. There were several arrangements
of numbers of dots, with each unique combination forming an
experimental item. There were 4 such items containing sets of
numbers of dots as follow: (6,15,24); (16,25,34); (26,35,44);
(36,45,54). The position of the dots within a square was ran-
domised for each square. Each trial appeared equally often
with the smaller number on the left as with the smaller num-
ber on the right.
Participants
38 people volunteered to participate in a pair of experiments
that included this one and an unrelated experiment in return
for £7.50. These were students and staff at University of Ab-
erdeen. 21 were male and 17 were female.
Procedure
On arrival, participants were seated in a quiet cubicle. The
experimenter explained the task, indicating that participants
should respond as quickly as possible while avoiding errors.
There was a practice block of 6 trials during which the exper-
imenter was present. After the participants had completed
the practice block they were invited to ask any questions
they might have. After answering these questions, the ex-
perimenter left the room for the main experimental block.
The main experimental block took about 15 – 25 minutes.
The participants then took a break. A second, unrelated, ex-
periment was administered following the break. Participants
knew that there were 2 experiments when they agreed to par-
ticipate.
Hypotheses
We predicted a main effect of selection task and a main effect
of vagueness, as follows:
1. We hypothesised that, in line with earlier experiments, the
comparison task instructions would receive faster response
times than the matching task instructions yielding a main
effect of selection task.
Table 1: Examples of the wording of the instructions, by condition
Text vagueness selection process
Choose a square with 6 dots. crisp matching
Choose a square with about 10 dots. vague matching
Choose a square with fewer than 20 dots. crisp comparison
Choose a square with far fewer than 20 dots. vague comparison
2. We hypothesised that vagueness would exert a main ef-
fect such that vague comparison instructions would receive
faster response times than crisp comparison task instruc-
tions (planned contrast 1), and vague matching task in-
structions would receive faster response times than crisp
matching task instructions (planned contrast 2).
Results
A linear mixed effects model was built for Response Time
(RT). The model included terms for Selection, Vagueness,
and the Selection x Vagueness interaction, considered as fixed
effects, as well as random slopes for the fixed effects at each
level of participant and item. In the model of RT, the re-
sponse time was log-transformed and was treated as gaussian-
distributed. Table (2) shows the coefficients for the model of
RT. The means for RT are given in Figure (4).
With reference to hypothesis 1, on average there was the
predicted main effect of Selection on RT, with comparison
conditions causing faster responses versus the matching con-
ditions.
With reference to hypothesis 2, on average there was no re-
liable main effect of vagueness on RT. The planned contrasts
that follow from hypothesis 2 were as follows: there was an
advantage for vagueness in the planned contrast ‘vague com-
parison versus crisp comparison’; there was an unreliable ad-
vantage for crispness in the planned contrast ‘vague matching
versus crisp matching’.
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Figure 4: Mean response times by condition
Discussion
The main aim of this experiment was to test whether vague-
ness confers any cognitive benefits over and above those due
to differences in the selection task according to whether the
instruction mandates a comparison selection task or a match-
ing selection task, when number-use is held constant.
The main effect of selection task showed that the assump-
tion that the comparison task is easier than the matching task
is well-founded. People were reliably faster at responding in
the comparison task.
Vagueness did not exert a main effect in RT. However when
the comparison and selection tasks were analysed separately,
there was a small reliable decrease in RT from the crisp to the
vague comparison tasks, but RT was not reliably affected by
vagueness in the matching tasks.
The benefits of vagueness in the comparison task here
could be explained as differences in the number of valid tar-
gets for the expression, as follows. Taking as an example the
stimulus with (6,15,24) dots, it could be argued that the vague
comparison instruction (e.g., a square with far fewer than 20
dots) has one valid target, the square with 6 dots, while the
crisp comparison instruction (e.g., a square with fewer than
20 dots) has two valid targets, the squares with 6 and 15 dots.
We found that people were quicker to identify a square when
the instruction only had one valid target. This leads us to
speculate that the benefit for vagueness here could be due to
the vague expression foregrounding a particular valid target
while the crisp expression carries with it the additional task
of distinguishing between two alternative valid targets. We
intend to follow up this possible benefit of vagueness, that
could perhaps be called a “range-reduction” benefit, in sub-
sequent experiments.
Taking stock now, what is the best explanation of our find-
ings so far across the series of experiments?
Experiment 2 showed us that there are clear differences
in RT according to whether the instruction is vague or crisp,
but the experiment could not distinguish effects of vagueness
from those of number-avoidance.
Experiment 3 showed us that number-avoidance is an im-
portant factor driving response times in the task, and that
vagueness does not have any additional explanatory power
at either level of number-use, but the experiment could not
distinguish benefits of number-avoidance from those of the
comparison selection task.
The present Experiment 4 showed us that there are ef-
Table 2: Coefficients and significance for a model of log transformed response times
Estimate SE t p sig
Main effect of selection 0.19 0.05 4.13 0.00 ***
Main effect of vagueness 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.93
Interaction selection x vagueness 0.08 0.06 1.29 0.28
Crisp comparison vs vague comparison 0.04 0.01 2.63 0.03 *
Crisp matching vs vague matching -0.04 0.05 -0.78 0.49
fects of the selection task mandated by the instruction when
number-avoidance is controlled by making all the instructions
use a number, and that within this vagueness exerts bene-
fits when the selection task is comparison, but not when the
task is matching. Our next experiment will test for effects of
vagueness and selection task when number-avoidance is con-
trolled by making all the instructions avoid using a number.
The findings from the experiments to date show that when
vague expressions are compared with crisp alternatives in our
forced choice task, vague expressions appear to yield bene-
fits in some situations, but that the observed benefits may be
due to factors other than vagueness itself that the vague forms
bring along with them: factors like avoiding numbers and per-
mitting comparison tasks. A possibility raised by the present
experiment is that vague references might aid the identifica-
tion of particular targets by reducing the range of valid targets
in expressions like far fewer than.
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